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14. ABSTRACT

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the protracted conflict in Southwest Asia, today serves at the center stage of the fight against a global insurgency. OIF merely reaffirms other historical examples of key leadership capabilities required of U.S. land forces, and the United States Army in particular, for these types of prolonged conflicts. In addition, OIF reflects the changed nature of the world, providing insight to new and modified capabilities required of leaders. Some of these leadership capabilities the Army brought to the fight, others were learned along the way, and still others require development and distribution throughout the force. These capabilities exist both separately and simultaneously at the tactical to the operational levels. This paper describes the leadership capabilities required within the Army to "win the peace" in the 21st Century operational and tactical environment. In doing so, this paper will identify the state of those capabilities in the current force, and how to train and equip leaders with critical capabilities now and in the future.

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WINNING THE PEACE – ARMY LEADERSHIP TRAINING

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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23 October 2006

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Abstract

Winning the Peace: Army Leadership Training

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the protracted conflict in Southwest Asia, today serves at the center stage of the fight against a global insurgency. OIF merely reaffirms other historical examples of key leadership capabilities required of U.S. land forces, and the United States Army in particular, for these types of prolonged conflicts. In addition, OIF reflects the changed nature of the world, providing insight to new and modified capabilities required of leaders. Some of these leadership capabilities the Army brought to the fight, others were learned along the way, and still others require development and distribution throughout the force. These capabilities exist both separately and simultaneously at the tactical to the operational levels. This paper describes the leadership capabilities required within the Army to "win the peace" in the 21st Century operational and tactical environment. In doing so, this paper will identify the state of those capabilities in the current force, and how to train and equip leaders with critical capabilities now and in the future.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout our nation's history the Army has been called upon to apply military force. Army leaders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels have done their best to direct their capabilities to greatest effect in order to accomplish the military mission. From the American Revolution, through two World Wars, Vietnam, and several other conflicts, the tradition of our Army has been to "win the war." To do so, the Army has focused on prevailing in large-scale decisive battles, sequenced in time, space, and forces to achieve the desired military objective against the enemy.

Most recently, the Army and it's leaders, as part of a combined and joint force, "won the war" in Iraq. The Army rapidly defeated Iraqi military forces, seized the Center of Gravity – the enemy capital, and removed the national leadership. By the Army's traditional definitions of success it had "won the war" with speed, initiative, and even "shock and awe." In the aftermath, however, the Army and it's leaders were seemingly unprepared to "win the peace." The result has been a prolonged insurgency, an ongoing threat of civil war, and immeasurable progress towards an exit strategy. How did this happen – what is missing or underdeveloped in our leaders, and how do we fix it so that the Army can "win the peace" after we've "won the war?"

To "win the peace" the Army must break from it's longstanding fixation with "winning the war." To shift operations toward "winning the peace," the Army will have to adopt a comprehensive training program that develops leaders who can prevail over the many challenges presented after the war has already been won. This paper presents the elements of change required to better train Army leaders. Trained in the requisite skills and capabilities, Army leaders can contribute more effectively toward "winning the peace."

"Winning the peace" has enduring relevance beyond Iraq as the Global War on Terror continues. Against a global insurgency orchestrated by Al Qaeda and other non-state actors, Army leaders can expect continued requirements to not only "win the war" but "win the peace" in challenging locations and situations. For the Army not to recognize it's inherent responsibility to modify leadership training to "win the peace," risks not only our nation's primacy among the world community but our country's overall security.

ANALYSIS

Definitions. By way of definition, the term "winning the war" equates to conflict termination, defined in Army doctrine as, "The point at which the principal means of the conflict shifts from the use or threat of use of force to other means of persuasion."[1] Strangely enough, no doctrinal definition exists at the Army or joint level for "post-conflict resolution" or any similar term! Instead, I will define "winning the peace" as equating to conflict or post-conflict resolution, which is, "The point at which the nation has achieved it's objectives and a state of relative 'peace' exists." The simple act of searching for definitions reveals the Army's historical focus on achieving conflict termination (winning the war) without considerable or sufficient consideration of conflict resolution (winning the peace).

History – the American Revolution. In our nation's first war, the Continental Army under General Washington's leadership fought to achieve decisive success against the British Army. With the help of French allies, Washington realized conflict termination by forcing Lord Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown in 1781.[2] With the war won in 1781, the Americans found they had no common view of their nation in peace. In 1782, the new nation would

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[1] U.S. Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, Field Manual (FM) 1-02 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 2004), I-43.

[2] James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic* (Wheeling: PA: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982), 181.

negotiate a favorable peace settlement, not through clear planning but through sheer luck of circumstance.[3] Without a plan for the army after the war, Washington would narrowly avert a military coup from his own officers during the Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783.[4] In fact, the fledgling nation would take another six years to move from conflict termination to conflict resolution. The peace would not be won until Americans adopted the Constitution in 1787, a unifying document that "was as much a military as a political and economic charter."[5]

History – Post WWII Japan. In World War II the military started planning to win the peace as early as 1942.[6] Looking at the situation in the Far East, the military, led by the Army, developed a comprehensive plan for the occupation of Japan. In reviewing the plan, however, orders focused only on initial tasks following surrender. The plan declared no clear view of end state, and questions went unanswered about the future government of Japan, the future of the Japanese military, economic aid, and humanitarian support.[7] Fortuitously, the culturally aware and capable General MacArthur, and an accepting and cooperative Japanese populace under the leadership of their emperor, worked together to win the peace in post-war Japan.

History – Operation Just Cause. Recent history confirms the Army trend of winning the war, but not the peace. In the 1989 invasion of Panama, the SOUTHCOM Commander, General Maxwell R. Thurman, readily admitted, "I did not spend five minutes on Blind Logic [the post-conflict plan] during my briefing as the incoming [commander] in

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[3] Ibid., 184-186.

[4] Ibid, 194.

[5] Ibid, 206.

[6] William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 107.

[7] General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, "Basic Outline Plan for "Blacklist" Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea After Surrender or Collapse," box 810, RG 496, Records of GHQ, SWP & USAFP, 1-24.

August." He goes on to say, "The warfighting elements are mainly interested in conflict termination as opposed to post-conflict restoration. Which is admittedly a problem for us in the military establishment."[8] The SOUTHCOM Commander openly and succinctly summarized the trend of our military, and our Army leaders as they exist today.

The list of historical examples is long, to include the current situations for Army leaders in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. US military leaders, the Army's included, lack the capability, the direction, or perhaps both, to win the peace upon winning the war.

Training and Preparation - Winning the War, not Winning the Peace. So, why are Army leaders unprepared to win the peace? An overview of training emphasis and leader focus goes a long way towards an explanation. In 1980, the United States Army opened the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. Soon afterward the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) were established at Hohenfels, Germany and Fort Polk, Louisiana, respectively. Each of these Combat Training Centers (CTCs) focused, and continues to focus, on tactical excellence from the individual to brigade level. The overall intent of CTCs was to place leaders and units in realistic combat environments "to increase their chances of surviving early engagements and battles without paying the inordinately high price in blood" that the Army traditionally has paid in "first battles" throughout history.[9] For more than 25 years, the Army has dedicated immense resources and energy to tactical superiority to win the war, and all to great effect, as exhibited by overwhelming tactical successes in Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. Army leaders, like leaders in their sister services,

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[8] Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," 108-109.
[9] Barry D. Watts, "A Net Assessment of Training and Education for Combat as a Source of Sustainable Military Advantage," (Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments, for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 23 August 2006), 6.

enjoy clear tactical advantages over their adversaries due in large part to the hard work done at training centers like the Army's CTCs. Army leaders are trained and taught at the CTCs how to fight and win – how to win the war. If we look at CTC training strategy, however, we see little emphasis on preparing leaders for post-conflict resolution - winning the peace. This lack of emphasis clearly reflects the lack of conflict resolution in the same Operations listed above.

Problem Solving – JOPP to Win the War, not the Peace. If training remains focused at the tactical, win the war, level, what about the Army's problem solving process? Investigation reveals a correspondingly consistent "win the war approach," versus a "win the peace" orientation. The Army utilizes the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP), which the Army's has labeled the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).[10] MDMP would be readily recognized by Captain Eisenhower or Patton – it's a process little changed since it's introduction prior to World War II.[11] In essence, Army leaders continue to utilize the process that keeps them focused on winning the war, instead of the peace.

By doctrine and process, JOPP guides Army leaders at all levels to attack the enemy Center of Gravity (COG) to achieve a designated objective (tactical, operational, or strategic). Following successful attack and toppling of an enemy COG, a vacuum of power and control invariably occurs. This vacuum is a result of "winning the war" transitioning to "winning the peace."[12] Thus, just as JOPP solves the problem of conflict termination, an entirely new set of challenges arise. The challenges exist at a level of complexity and variety that far exceeds the limits of JOPP, requiring an operational design capability – a "design

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[10] U.S. Army, Army Planning and Orders Production, Field Manual (FM) 5-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, January 2005), 1-2.
[11] Ibid., vii.
[12] Pierre Lessard, "Campaign Design for Winning the War… and the Peace," *Parameters* (Summer 2005): 38.

gap" that JOPP cannot fill.[13] The Army must identify and train leaders to fill this "design gap" to win the peace by preparing leaders capable of operational design.

      Tactical capabilities – Win the War, not the Peace. As mentioned above, the focus of preparing the Army and it's leaders has been towards overall tactical superiority. Individual and small unit excellence resides at the higher end of the operations spectrum – or High Intensity Conflict (HIC). The Army has trained counterinsurgency or Security, Support, Training and Reconstruction (SSTR) only after achieving HIC competency, or "just in time" for such types of deployments. The result, in a reality of limited resources and time, is a HIC-trained leadership and force with limited SSTR proficiency, with On the Job Training as the order of the day.

      Multinational Integration. Today's global environment dictates that the Army and it's leaders operate as part of a multinational team. United Nations, alliance, coalition, and combined operations offer different potentials and challenges. These organizations change, come into being, or even disappear as the situation transitions from conflict termination to conflict resolution. Army leaders require familiarity with and understanding of the variety of military organizations they operate with to win the peace.

      Interagency Integration and NGO, IO Cooperation. As mentioned previously, operational design encompasses a complex and unique set of challenges to win the peace. In many respects, "conflict termination is primarily a civil problem that may require military support."[14] Historical analysis of successful counterinsurgencies and post-conflict resolution experiences provide a set of "best practices" common to winning the peace. They include a majority of non-military activities such as: focusing on the population and their needs;

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[13] Watts, "A Net Assessment of Training and Education for Combat as a Source of Sustainable Military Advantage," 10.

[14] Lessard, "Campaign Design for Winning the War… and the Peace," 40.

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isolating insurgents from the population; amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents; and Police in the lead, military supporting.[15] All these practices imply Army leadership and forces in a supporting versus supported role. A plethora of organizations, mostly non-military, become players, including the supported effort. All told, the Army and it's leaders have to adapt to perform effectively in contributing to winning the peace.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Training and Preparation – Winning the Peace. For more than two decades the Army has focused training towards high intensity conflict at it's premier CTCs. The overriding purpose has been to win the war quickly, decisively, and at minimum cost in American human treasure. This focus has resulted in clear tactical advantage through several conflicts during the corresponding time period. To win the peace the training experience must expand to focus beyond conflict termination and encompass conflict resolution. Leaders and their staffs must orient past the immediate military objective of defeating the enemy on the battlefield with overwhelming effects, and toward the more elusive, less readily defined, and less militarily-oriented conflict resolution end state.

First, the Army must train leaders to conduct immediate "peace-winning" operations following conflict termination. While winning the war, the Army and its military partners are the main effort – the supported set of organizations. To win the peace the Army becomes a supporting organization. As the conflict transitions from termination (where the Army is supported) to resolution (where the Army is supporting) a transitory period develops where Army leaders must remain in control of the situation pending transfer of responsibilities to non-military actors (indigenous governments, police forces, other agencies, NGOs/IOs, etc.). Training and preparation currently fail to address this critical transitory period. Our inability

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[15] Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 10.

to execute this important transition creates a vacuum in which anarchy, human suffering, and insurgency flourish. This vacuum breeds the "adversaries" that contend against our winning the peace. By controlling the transition from conflict termination to conflict resolution, Army leaders provide essential support to the effort to win the peace.

Second, the Army must train leaders in operations that ensue once transfer of responsibility occurs. As the Army and it's military partners become supporting members to other agencies, indigenous forces, NGOs, and IOs, their tasks and missions become more complex. As such, leaders and their organizations must plan, prepare, and practice post-conflict resolution to achieve the peace.

What this means for CTCs, and for training in general, is that they must provide Army leaders with an expanded and comprehensive approach that takes them away from winning just the war and reorients them toward winning the peace. This is a phase shift in training focus and mental effort. CTC training must extend from merely fighting and winning battles, to include the transition from supporting to supported effort in an interagency, multinational, and IO/NGO environment, to the follow-on conduct of SSTR operations. All efforts, to include those conducted during conflict termination, are now fixed on winning the peace.

Problem Solving – Operational Design. Winning the peace creates a problem solving dilemma that exceeds the JOPP. Operational design is the answer, but it requires leaders with distinctive cognitive capabilities. Leaders must be capable of creating operational and strategic courses of action to deal with incredibly complex situations "almost certainly involving an iterative interplay between intuitive pattern recognition (or

"selectionism") and explicit analytical-logical reasoning."[16] This capability goes far beyond the split-second decisions required of tactical leaders and the highly structured analytics of JOPP.[17]

A dilemma exists between three skill types – those with skills and potential at tactical/analytical decision making levels, those with skills and potential at operational design, and those with both. Cognitive requirements for JOPP and operational design are entirely different, and perhaps mutually exclusive.[18] Leaders who excel at the tactical level may not succeed at the operational, and more importantly, those who excel at the operational level may not succeed at the tactical. Army personnel management does not currently support leaders who may excel only at operational design – leaders must first prove themselves at the tactical level. Those who lead the best in tactical situations are advanced higher and faster than the rest, eventually to operational levels. Those who succeed in tactical situations and possess skills in operational design – so much the better, they arguably become our most senior leaders. But, tactical excellence always comes first in today's Army. In this process we again see overriding emphasis on winning the war. Thus we may eliminate from service, or at least marginalize, those leaders with the potential to solve our most complex, challenging, and significant problems toward winning the peace.

To solve this personnel dilemma requires early identification and training of select officers. Those exhibiting cognitive skills that support operational design should progress along promotion timelines similar to their tactically talented counterparts, and they may eventually outstrip their tactical counterparts at senior grades, as they populate operational

[16] Watts, "A Net Assessment of Training and Education for Combat as a Source of Sustainable Military Advantage," 14.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid., 15.

and strategic level staffs. Operationally talented leaders will require additional training and

experiences to hone their operational design skills, even at the expense of tactical command.

Those "very best" leaders who exhibit tactical, analytical, and operational design cognitive

skills will require carefully managed career paths, as their time will consume both successful

tactical and successful operational assignments and training. All told, this portends

significant changes to the Army personnel management system in order to properly identify,

train, and advance leaders along proper career paths.

Tactical capabilities – Winning the Peace. Army leaders and their formations have

repeatedly demonstrated superiority at winning the war. However, recent events in Iraq and

Afghanistan show continued struggle to win the peace. If we retain our tactical advantage in

warfighting skills to achieve winning the war, what skills and key capabilities must we train

our leaders on to win the peace?

Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Traditionally allocated as a Special Operations

Forces (SOF) responsibility, Army leaders in virtually all formations have been required to

train indigenous forces in Afghanistan and Iraq – the size of the mission has far exceeded

SOF capability.[19] FID has recently encompassed training and equipping security guards,

police, paramilitary forces, land, air, and maritime forces – many from scratch. This trend

will likely continue as the nation continues the GWOT against a global insurgency that can

organize, train, and support actors in a complex operating environment.

Reconstruction. Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven the need to train

leaders in skills far beyond conflict termination. To win the peace Army leaders must be

able to identify the needs of the population, how to best resource reconstruction, and how to

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[19] Douglas A. Olivant and Eric D. Chewning, "Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN
Operations," *Military Review* (July/August 2006): 54.

implement reconstruction, often in an extremely hostile environment. In the transition period discussed previously, Army leaders can expect to maintain leadership over reconstruction, at least until conditions occur for transfer of responsibility to non-military agencies.

Governance. Regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven exceptionally difficult for Army leaders to support. As mentioned previously, as the coalition attempted to transition from conflict termination to resolution activities, a power and control vacuum ensued from which the coalition (and Army leaders) have arguably never recovered.

Part of Army leaders' responsibilities in winning the peace after regime change include establishing, or at least initiating, governance. "Initially, the counterinsurgent must empower, through elections or appointment, local provisional leaders."[20] Army leaders and their formations rely upon local leaders to help them fill the power and control vacuum that results immediately following conflict termination. In regime change especially, Army leaders and local leaders work together to establish security, initiate economic development, and address the population's issues and concerns.[21] Army and local leader activities give way to the eventual development of long-term popular government at the local, regional, and national levels. Together, Army and local leaders can establish the beginnings of legitimacy from which the new government, and conflict resolution, will proceed.

The requirement to provide or enable governance following conflict termination has not been addressed with the framework of Army training doctrine. Leaders' participation in this process cannot occur "on the fly" as it did in Iraq following the ground campaign – it doesn't work. Governance training must become part of the overall training plan for Army leaders to win the peace.

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[20] Ibid., 56.
[21] Ibid.

Multinational Integration. In order to operate successfully in the new global environment, Army leaders must train as part of a multinational team. Following the Goldwater-Nichols Act military priorities focused on joint operations and training. The 21st Century focus must be on combined, coalition, and allied operations. Clearly, part of the new training process for Army leaders must be training and operating with other nations. With ever-increasing demands on our nation's forces, increased effectiveness of integrating with other nation's militaries is a condition of winning the peace.

Interagency Integration and NGO/IO Cooperation. Similar to multinational integration, there exists a critical requirement to operate with other agencies, NGOs and IOs. Accordingly, the 21st Century leadership training process must also include interagency and NGO/IO integration and cooperation.

Leader Career Management. In the end, Army leaders must retain the Army's current qualitative advantage in it's ability to win the war, while building capability to establish the same advantage over adversaries and circumstance to win the peace. The critical element to achieving this advantage will no doubt be time. The Army will have to find the time to train these necessary tasks and skills.

One way to provide additional time to prepare leaders is to spend more of it at each position and grade. As stated by US Army Brigadier General David Huntoon, "We are rushing officers through promotion gates too fast to ensure they are amassing the experience and expertise necessary to be able to summon up the instincts, insights, foresight, and wisdom essential to success in a complex battlespace."[22] By slowing promotions, leaders have more time to train at their current grade and prepare themselves for their next grade.

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[22] Michael Flowers, "Improving Strategic Leadership," *Military Review* (March/April 2004): 41.

Addressing the requirement to develop cognitive skills to support operational design reinforces that more time is required at each grade. "A review of general officer resumes reveals that they often have little time for assignments that provide opportunities for quality reflection and study."[23] In addition, the need to provide leaders with broad experiences necessary for operational design adds to the complexity of career management. "Coupled with education, experience in the interagency process is increasingly useful for senior leaders. Operations with increased strategic and political implications, as well as joint, interagency, and multinational execution early in an officer's career will become the norm."[24] Again, the obvious answer to providing these experiences through increased assignments is time in rank beyond what the Army programs for its leaders today.

To fundamentally change officer promotion schemes and career experiences requires a cultural change championed by the highest level of Army leadership. Perhaps the best case for changing Army leader development comes from a former Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, who said of his assignment as SFOR commander, that it "was the most difficult leadership experience I have ever had. Nothing quite prepares you for this."[25] With clear recognition by senior Army leadership, the Army can more readily implement change for it's leaders, allowing them to win the peace.

Lifetime of training/learning – self-development. An important aspect of leadership training is self-development. Unfortunately, training doctrine currently fails to adequately address self-development. Properly executed, self-development can help fill gaps unfilled by formal Army education and training.[26] Currently self-development is self-paced and self-

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[23] Ibid., 42
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 41.
[26] Ibid., 43.

imposed, lacking structure or compliance to supplement leader development. To adequately instill in leaders a lifetime of learning the Army must implement a comprehensive, resourced, and monitored program. Organizational support to the program could include, but is not limited to, distribution of reading materials, and access to Internet resources as "one-stop shopping" resources of learning.[27] The proper utilization of a self-development program can "round out" a wide-ranging training and development plan, allowing leaders to train the full gamut of capabilities and skills necessary to move from winning the war to winning the peace.

CONCLUSION

A series of training initiatives aimed at winning the peace will better prepare Army leaders as they continue the ongoing Global War on Terror.

Training and Preparation – Winning the Peace. Army operations at all levels must shift from winning the war to winning the peace. Leaders must recognize this change in paradigm, with training focus changed accordingly. Training at the Army's CTCs will incorporate a conflict termination – transition – conflict resolution strategy to drive the execution of an array of military operations toward the common goal of achieving conflict resolution.

Problem Solving – Operational Design. At the operational level Army leaders require training and development of cognitive skills that take them away from the "reflex" or situation-based model of tactical decision-making as well as the analytical and procedure-oriented system of JOPP, toward the more intuitive process of operational design. Success at operational design requires leaders with broad experiences with interagency, NGO, IO, and

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[27] Jeffrey J. Snow, "Self-Development: An Important Aspect of Leader Development," (Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 7 April 2003), 18, http://stinet.dtic.mil/ (accessed 14 September 2006). Available as Defense Technical Information Report (DTIC), ADA404754.

other activities as well as advanced academic and intellectual development. With proper training and preparation Army leaders can grasp the breadth and depth of a given situation, and apply unique and comprehensive solutions in a timely and reasonable manner to win the peace. The Army personnel system will require methods to identify, train, and assign leaders with potential in operational design.

Tactical capabilities – Winning the Peace. Army leaders and their formations already exhibit tactical superiority at warfighting (HIC) skills. To win the peace, leaders will have to achieve corresponding excellence in the skills required to support conflict resolution. These skills include Foreign Internal Defense (FID), reconstruction, and governance, and they differ significantly from those that Army leaders are familiar with in winning the war. They will require equal, if not more, emphasis and resources than HIC skills training to achieve corresponding superiority in the overall effort to win the peace.

Multinational and Interagency Integration, and NGO/IO Cooperation. In the Complex Operating Environment (COE), and especially in the supporting role Army leaders take on while winning the peace, proper integration and cooperation is essential. To properly perform in the COE, Army leaders require training and experience with these organizations.

Leader Career Management. The analysis of the requirements for winning the peace has not revealed the elimination of any tasks or skills currently resident in Army leaders. Instead, to win the war, leaders must acquire additional capabilities on top of what they already possess. Logically, this addition to capabilities requires more time to train leaders, and the best way to increase their time is to decrease the pace promotion. By spending more time at their respective ranks, leaders can receive the proper education, training, and experiences necessary to succeed at winning the peace.

Army leaders have always done their utmost to achieve the nation's bidding. Their previous focus and understanding of mission have always been – win the war. Today that is not enough, and a phase shift must occur so the nation can win the peace in multiple theaters as it successfully prosecutes the overall Global War On Terror. The importance of winning the peace has long-lasting as well as immediate implications for Army leaders. As a sobering measure one should consider relative costs in Iraq between winning the war and peace. Less than 300 U.S. military members lost their lives to win the war in Iraq. More than 2,500 have lost their lives in the ongoing attempt to win the peace.[28] No greater imperative for the changes that face Army leaders is necessary.

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[28] Michael Ewens, "Casualties in Iraq: The Human Cost of Occupation," http://www.antiwar.com/casualties (accessed 18 October 2006).

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